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Abstract
Using a simple product di®erentiation model with elastic demands, we investigate the
relationship between di®erentiation strategies and vertical relations. Depending on the
competitive structure in the upstream market, three di®erentiation patterns (maximum,
minimum and partial di®erentiation) can appear in equilibrium even though each down-
stream ¯rm freely determines the degree of product di®erentiation. When downstream
¯rms must incur positive investment costs to di®erentiate their products, they tend to do
so if the upstream market is competitive.
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1 Introduction
Manufacturers often have relationships with many input suppliers. For instance, in the aircraft
industry, the jet (turboprop) engine and aircraft industries are vertically related. To produce
a di®erentiated product, aircraft ¯rms must procure suitable but costly equipment. Engine
companies also have relations with many buyers, and potentially with all of them (Bonaccorsi
and Giuri (2001)). In the automobile industry, Toyota procures electric parts from many
input suppliers, including Denso, which is one of the largest auto part manufacturers.1 Denso
sometimes supplies other automobile manufacturers, for instance Daimler Chrysler. Thus, its
electrical parts may be used in automobiles from di®erent manufacturers.
When manufacturers produce (horizontally) di®erentiated products, they sometimes face
constraints that stem from the technological capacities of suppliers. When those manufactur-
ers are able to negotiate with many suppliers of suitable inputs, they can procure those inputs
at reasonable prices. In contrast, when there are only a few suppliers of suitable inputs, the
manufacturers must pay higher prices. That is, competitiveness in input markets a®ects the
procurement conditions of manufacturers.
Because decisions on product positioning (di®erentiation), which is an important strategic
tool of ¯rms, are in°uenced by such buyer{supplier relationships,2 some researchers investi-
gate the relationship between di®erentiation strategies and vertical relations. Using Hotelling
location models, Brekke and Straume (2004) and Matsushima (2004, 2008) discuss how up-
stream units a®ect the di®erentiation strategies of downstream ¯rms.3 In Brekke and Straume
(2004), ¯rms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers. They show
1 Ahmadjian and Lincoln (2001) research the vertical relationship between Toyota and Denso.
2 There are many studies on product positioning decisions. See, for instance, Hotelling (1929), d'Aspremont
et al. (1979), Hauser and Shugan (1983), Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995), and Sayman, Hoch, and Raju
(2002).
3 B¶arcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008) incorporate the sequential move of upstream prices (wages) into
the model of Brekke and Straume (2004). Using a Hotelling location model, Erkal (2007) also investigates how
the buyer{supplier relationship a®ects di®erentiation strategies.
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that the existence of upstream suppliers enhances the degree of product di®erentiation. In
Matsushima (2004, 2008), each upstream ¯rm that locates in a linear city engages in price
competition for the business of downstream ¯rms. To supply one unit of input to a down-
stream ¯rm, each upstream ¯rm incurs a transport cost quadratic in distance. These papers
show that the degree of product di®erentiation decreases as the coe±cient of the quadratic
transport cost incurred by each upstream ¯rm increases. Although the settings of Brekke and
Straume (2004) and Matsushima (2004, 2008) are only slightly di®erent, those papers provide
quite di®erent results.
Although those researchers provide interesting insights into the relationship between dif-
ferentiation strategies and vertical relations, they only consider markets in which downstream
¯rms compete in price (strategic complement). Moreover, consumer demand is inelastic in
their models because they use Hotelling models. It is not obvious how vertical relations af-
fect the di®erentiation strategies of downstream ¯rms when such ¯rms compete in quantity
(strategic substitute). The aim of this paper is to investigate this problem. Moreover, a
further contribution of this paper is that our model succeeds in merging the previous three
papers into a simple duopoly model with elastic demand functions.
The model setting of the paper is as follows. There are two upstream and two down-
stream ¯rms. Each downstream ¯rm produces a di®erentiated ¯nal product, and must buy
an input from the upstream ¯rms. Each downstream ¯rm determines the degree of prod-
uct di®erentiation (denoted by °). Each ¯rm must incur investment costs to di®erentiate its
product (product R&D). We consider two cases concerning the competitive environment of
upstream ¯rms. First, each upstream ¯rm has a bilateral monopoly relation with its buyer (a
downstream ¯rm). Second, each upstream ¯rm faces competitive forces that can potentially
deprive it of its trade with its downstream partner. To supply one unit of input to a down-
stream ¯rm, the potential suppliers must incur two additional marginal costs (k + ¿di) that
depend on the degree of product R&D that the downstream ¯rm undertakes (di 2 [0; 1=2],
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1¡ d1 ¡ d2 = °), where k and ¿ are positive constants. We can interpret the additional costs
of potential suppliers as being the conversion cost from the product of the upstream ¯rm into
an input suitable for the downstream ¯rm. After purchasing its input from an upstream ¯rm,
each downstream ¯rm sets the quantity to be supplied.
We show that when the investment cost for product R&D is zero, maximum di®erentiation
appears in equilibrium if k is large or ¿ is small. If k is small and ¿ is large, minimum
di®erentiation appears. If k has an intermediate value and ¿ is large, only one downstream
¯rm engages in product R&D. We also show that both minimum and maximum di®erentiation
appear in equilibrium if k is small and ¿ has an intermediate value. Moreover, we show that
when the investment cost for product R&D is positive, minimum di®erentiation tends to
appear in equilibrium if each upstream ¯rm has a bilateral monopoly relation with its buyer
(a downstream ¯rm). A slight di®erence in product R&D technologies leads to quite di®erent
equilibrium outcomes in product di®erentiation. Those results are somewhat di®erent from
Brekke and Straume (2004) and Matsushima (2004, 2008), and provide additional insights
into the discussion of the relationship between product di®erentiation and vertical relations.
The setting and the results of this paper are related to the case of the aircraft industry.4
There are two major ¯rms in this industry, Airbus and Boeing. Those ¯rms rely heavily on
¯rm-speci¯c inputs (engines, wings, horizontal stabilizers) produced by independent manu-
facturers. For instance, Rolls Royce and CFM International (a joint venture between GE
and the French company Snecma) make highly speci¯c turbofan engines for airplanes. Rolls
Royce made the Trent XWB turbofan engine to meet the speci¯c requirements of the Airbus
A350 XWB family, and developed the Trent 900 series exclusively to power the new Airbus
A380. Furthermore, CFM International designed the CFM56-3 turbofan engine exclusively
for Boeing aircraft.5 Under the procurement condition, Airbus and Boeing have considered
4 This paragraph is based on the discussions in Beelaerts van Blokland et al. (2008), Nalebu® (2002), Esty
and Ghemawat (2002), and Tombak (2006).
5 In reality, these engine manufacturers sometimes supply both Airbus and Boeing if possible.
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whether their products should be di®erentiated. At one time, Airbus and Boeing produced
highly di®erentiated aircraft (A380 and Boeing 787), however at other times, they produced
less-di®erentiated aircraft (the A340 and Boeing 747(777)) and competed directly.6 From this
real world example, we can say that the technological constraints of input suppliers crucially
a®ect the di®erentiation strategies of the two aircraft ¯rms.
This paper is closely related to that of Lin and Saggi (2002). Using linear demand functions
with product di®erentiation, they discuss the relationship between process and product R&D.7
We add vertical relations to their model, and our motivation is quite di®erent from theirs. Our
main concern is how the existence of upstream ¯rms and competition between them a®ects
the di®erentiation strategies of downstream ¯rms.8
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the basic environment. Section
3 provides an analysis of the model. Section 4 discusses the relationship between vertical
relations and di®erentiation strategies. Finally, Section 5 o®ers some concluding remarks.
6 The A3XX (which was rechristened the A380) program was formally launched in December 2000. After
that event, Boeing abandoned the Sonic Cruise development program and launched the 787 program because
of concerns about fuel e±ciency in the ailing airline industry in 2002. Therefore, the A380 and Boeing 787
are highly di®erentiated. In 1987, Airbus launched the A330 and A340 airframes, which were designed to
compete with the Boeing 747 on medium- to long-distance routes. Boeing then postponed the 7J7 project to
develop a short-range 150-seat aircraft (which has the potential to di®erentiate its product line from that of
the large-scale intercontinental commercial jet market) and then developed the 777 airframe with technological
features, seating capacity and range similar to those of the A340.
7 Most subsequent studies of Lin and Saggi (2002) also focus on the complementarity of process and product
R&D, which is not the focus of this paper. See, for instance, Mantovani (2006) and Braun (2008).
8 There are discussions on how vertical structure a®ects incentives of upstream and/or downstream ¯rms for
innovative activities. Given vertical market structures and competition environments, Ishii (2004) and Milliou
(2004) discuss spillover e®ects of R&D investments. Banerjee and Lin (2003), Brocas (2003), and Buehler
and Schmutzler (2008) focus on the relation of vertical market structure and cost-reducing investment in
oligopoly. These papers do not discuss how the existence of upstream ¯rms a®ects the di®erentiation strategies
of downstream ¯rms. Pepall and Norman (2001) also consider vertical relationships and product di®erentiation.
They consider vertical mergers and vertical foreclosure, but not endogenous product di®erentiation. In their
model, the degree of product di®erentiation of the downstream ¯rms is exogenous.
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2 The model
We consider a market with two downstream and two upstream ¯rms. There is only one factor
of production, which we refer to as the input. Each ¯rm produces a di®erentiated ¯nal good
in a constant-returns-to-scale process where one unit of the input becomes one unit of the
¯nal good. Each downstream ¯rm can perform this conversion at no cost.
We assume that the two downstream ¯rms compete in quantity. Now let xi denote i's
sales. The inverse demand function of ¯rm i is given by
pi = 1¡ xi ¡ °xj ; i = 1; 2; i 6= j: (1)
where pi is the price of the ¯nal good produced by i, and °(2 [0; 1]) indicates the degree of
product di®erentiation between the products. The lower the value of °, the higher the degree
of product di®erentiation. The value of ° is determined by each ¯rm's investment in product
R&D, denoted by di (i = 1; 2).
We consider the downstream ¯rm's investments in product R&D. Following the setting in
Lin and Saggi (2002),9 we assume that the value of ° is determined by each downstream ¯rm's
investment in product R&D, denoted by di (i = 1; 2). The extent of product di®erentiation
is ° = 1¡ (d1 + d2); and 0 · di · 1=2. The cost of product R&D is given by F (di), F 0 ¸ 0,
F 00 ¸ 0.
Let zi denote the amount of input supplied by the supplier of ¯rm i. Each input supplier
sets a wholesale price wi to maximize its pro¯t function (without loss of generality, we assume
that the marginal cost is normalized to zero):
¼Ui = wizi; i = 1; 2: (2)
The fact that the input suppliers unilaterally set the wholesale prices implies that they possess
full bargaining power.
9 See also Braun (2008), Cellini and Lambertini (2002), Lambertini et al. (1998), Rosenkranz (2003), and
Weiss (2003).
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In this paper, we consider two cases concerning the technologies of upstream ¯rms:
1. Neither upstream ¯rm faces a competitor.
2. Each upstream ¯rm faces competitors that are potentially able to supply the downstream
¯rms. If a competitor incurs a marginal cost, fi = ¿di + k, it is able to supply input to
downstream ¯rm i, where ¿ and k are positive constants, and di is the level of product
R&D engaged in by downstream ¯rm i (i = 1; 2).
In the ¯rst case, each upstream ¯rm is in a monopoly position with respect to its trading
partner, similar to the setting in Brekke and Straume (2004). In the second case, upstream
¯rms face potentially harmful competitive forces, which include rival upstream ¯rms supplying
the downstream ¯rm (that is, upstream ¯rms i and j are potential competitors (i = 1; 2, i 6=
j)). For instance, as mentioned in the introduction, while Rolls Royce and CFM International
supply highly speci¯c turbofan engines exclusively to Airbus and Boeing, respectively, these
engine suppliers are both potential suppliers of either Airbus or Boeing (in reality, these
engine manufacturers sometimes supply both Airbus and Boeing). Following the setting in
Matsushima (2004, 2008), we assume that the marginal cost fi is increasing in the degree of
product R&D, which is related to the degree of product di®erentiation. This case is a slightly
modi¯ed version of Matsushima (2004, 2008).10
We can interpret the ¯rst case as a special case of the second one. When k is su±ciently
high, potential competitors do not dare to supply inputs to a downstream ¯rm because the
marginal cost is prohibitively high. Because the ¯rst case is technically simpler than the
second, we show both cases separately.
To summarize, we model the game structure as follows.
1. Each downstream ¯rm engages in product R&D.
10 This setting is somewhat similar to that of Aiura and Sato (2008), who discuss the di®erentiation strategies
of ¯rms in a Hotelling model.
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2. Each upstream input supplier sets its wholesale price.
3. Given these prices, each ¯rm simultaneously decides on a quantity to supply.
3 Analysis
3.1 No potential supplier
In this case, there is no potential competitor to the upstream ¯rms. Upstream ¯rm i unilat-
erally o®ers its wholesale price wi (i = 1; 2) to downstream ¯rm i.
The pro¯ts of downstream ¯rms 1 and 2 are:
¼D1 ´ (1¡ x1 ¡ °x2 ¡ w1)x1 ¡ F (d1); ¼D2 ´ (1¡ x2 ¡ °x1 ¡ w2)x2 ¡ F (d2): (3)
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
x1 =
2¡ ° ¡ 2w1 + °w2
4¡ °2 ; x2 =
2¡ ° ¡ 2w2 + °w1
4¡ °2 : (4)
The pro¯ts of the input suppliers are:
¼U1 =
w1(2¡ ° ¡ 2w1 + °w2)
4¡ °2 ; ¼U2 =
w2(2¡ ° ¡ 2w2 + °w1)
4¡ °2 : (5)
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
w1 = w2 =
2¡ °
4¡ ° : (6)
The equilibrium pro¯ts of the downstream and the upstream ¯rms are:
¼Di =
4
(4¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (di) (i = 1; 2); ¼U1 = ¼U2 =
2(2¡ °)
(4¡ °)2(2 + °) : (7)
3.2 Potential suppliers
In this case, potential suppliers can supply inputs to both downstream ¯rms. If fi = ¿di+k is
insu±ciently large, upstream ¯rm i faces the constraint that its wholesale price for downstream
¯rm i cannot exceed fi because other potential suppliers can undercut its wholesale price to
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downstream ¯rm i. Therefore, when we consider the determination of wholesale prices, we
must take into account the constraints.
The pro¯ts of downstream ¯rms 1 and 2 are:
¼D1 = (1¡ x1 ¡ °x2 ¡ w1)x1 ¡ F (d1); ¼D2 = (1¡ x2 ¡ °x1 ¡ w2)x2 ¡ F (d2): (8)
The ¯rst-order conditions lead to:
x1 =
2¡ ° ¡ 2w1 + °w2
4¡ °2 ; x2 =
2¡ ° ¡ 2w2 + °w1
4¡ °2 : (9)
The pro¯ts of the input suppliers are:
¼U1 =
w1(2¡ ° ¡ 2w1 + °w2)
4¡ °2 ; s:t: w1 · f1; (10)
¼U2 =
w2(2¡ ° ¡ 2w2 + °w2)
4¡ °2 ; s:t: w2 · f2: (11)
Without loss of generality, we assume that f1 ¸ f2, that is, d1 ¸ d2. In other words, the e®ort
of ¯rm 1 in product R&D is more signi¯cant than that of ¯rm 2. The ¯rst-order conditions
lead to: 8>>>>><>>>>>:
w1 = k + ¿d1; w2 = k + ¿d2; if k · k1;
w1 =
2¡ ° + °k + °¿d2
4
; w2 = k + ¿d2; if k1 < k · k2;
w1 = w2 =
2¡ °
4¡ ° ; if k2 < k;
(12)
where k1 ´ 2¡ ° ¡ ¿(4d1 ¡ °d2)4¡ ° ; k2 ´
2¡ ° ¡ ¿(4¡ °)d2
4¡ ° :
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The equilibrium pro¯ts of the downstream and the upstream ¯rms are:
(1)
8>><>>:
¼D1 =
((2¡ °)(1¡ k)¡ 2¿d1 + °¿d2)2
(2¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (d1);
¼D2 =
((2¡ °)(1¡ k)¡ 2¿d2 + °¿d1)2
(2¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (d2);
if k · k1;
(2)
8>><>>:
¼D1 =
(2¡ ° + °k + °¿d2)2
4(2¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (d1);
¼D2 =
((8¡ °2)(1¡ k)¡ 2° ¡ (8¡ °2)¿d2)2
16(2¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (d2);
if k1 < k · k2;
(3)
8><>:
¼D1 =
4
(4¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (d1);
¼D2 =
4
(4¡ °)2(2 + °)2 ¡ F (d2);
if k2 < k:
(13)
(1)
8>><>>:
¼U1 =
(k + ¿d1)((2¡ °)(1¡ k)¡ 2¿d1 + °¿d2)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ;
¼U2 =
(k + ¿d2)((2¡ °)(1¡ k)¡ 2¿d2 + °¿d1)
(2¡ °)(2 + °) ;
if k · k1;
(2)
8>><>>:
¼U1 =
(2¡ ° + °k + °¿d2)
8(2¡ °)(2 + °) ;
¼U2 =
(k + ¿d2)((8¡ °2)(1¡ k)¡ 2° ¡ (8¡ °2)¿d2)
4(2¡ °)(2 + °) ;
if k1 < k · k2;
(3)
8>><>>:
¼U1 =
2(2¡ °)
(4¡ °)2(2 + °) ;
¼U2 =
2(2¡ °)
(4¡ °)2(2 + °) ;
if k2 < k:
(14)
4 Endogenous product di®erentiation
We now discuss how each downstream ¯rm determines its products positions.
4.1 No investment cost (F = 0)
We now suppose that F = 0 for any di (i = 1; 2). Each downstream ¯rm freely sets ° =
1 ¡ d1 ¡ d2 to maximize its own pro¯t. We consider two cases: that with no competing
potential supplier and that with potential suppliers.
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4.1.1 No potential supplier
Di®erentiating ¼Di with respect to di, we have:
@¼D1
@d1
=
@¼D2
@d2
=
16(d1 + d2)
(3¡ d1 ¡ d2)3(3 + d1 + d2)3 ¸ 0: (15)
Therefore, each downstream ¯rm chooses di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2).
Proposition 1 When there is no potential competitor for either upstream ¯rm, if F = 0 for
any di (i = 1; 2), d1 = d2 = 1=2 in equilibrium.
4.1.2 Potential suppliers
To clarify the analysis, we now restrict the choices of the downstream ¯rms. We tentatively
assume that each downstream ¯rm has only two options, di = 0 and di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2).
Because of the simpli¯cation, the game is reduced to a simple 2£2 matrix. In the main text,
we only solve the 2 £ 2 matrix. Fortunately, we can show that the equilibrium outcomes
derived by the 2 £ 2 matrix really appear as equilibrium outcomes in the game in which
each downstream ¯rm freely sets di 2 [0; 1=2] (i = 1; 2).11 Roughly speaking, in this setting,
the pro¯t functions of the downstream ¯rms are convex with respect to di. Therefore, the
boundaries, di = 0 and di = 1=2, may be the best candidates.
There are three cases, depending on the endogenous and exogenous variables: (1) k · k1,
(2) k1 < k · k2, and (3) k2 < k (see equation (12)). When each ¯rm chooses di = 0
(i = 1; 2), that is, ° = 1, the ¯rst case appears if k · 1=3 and the third case appears if
1=3 < k. When one downstream ¯rm chooses di = 0 and another chooses dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2,
i 6= j), that is, ° = 1=2, the ¯rst case appears if k · (3 ¡ 4¿)=7, the second case appears if
(3¡4¿)=7 < k · 3=7, and the third case appears if 3=7 < k. When each ¯rm chooses di = 1=2
(i = 1; 2), that is, ° = 0, the ¯rst case appears if k · (1¡ ¿)=2 and the third case appears if
(1¡ ¿)=2 < k. We summarize the discussion in the following ¯gure.
11 The calculus is highly complex but does not provide any economic information. The calculus is available
from the authors on request.
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*************************
Figure 1 here
*************************
In Figure 1, (1), (2), and (3) refer to the equation number in equation (13) that applies to each
region. For instance, suppose that the values of k and ¿ are in region (e). When d1 = d2 = 0,
the third pro¯t function (3) in equation (13) applies; when di = 0 and dj = 1=2, the second
pro¯t function (2) in equation (13) applies; when d1 = d2 = 1=2, the ¯rst pro¯t function (1) in
equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described in Table 1 (note that, ° = 1¡ d1 ¡ d2).
*************************
Table 1 here
*************************
In region (e), both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k > 15¿ ¡ 3, otherwise
a ¯rm chooses di = 0 and another ¯rm chooses dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2, i 6= j) in equilibrium. We
can apply this argument to all eight regions. Solving the payo® matrices for the eight regions,
we have Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 When there are potential competitors for the upstream ¯rms, if F = 0 for
any di (i = 1; 2), depending on the exogenous values (k and ¿), the following outcome appears
in equilibrium:
d1 = d2 = 1=2 if
8<:
k · 33=109 and k · (6¡ 19¿)=6 or
33=109 · k · 12=31 and k ¸ 15¿ ¡ 3 or
12=31 · k;
d1 = 0 d2 = 1=2 if 1=3 · k · 12=31 and k · 15¿ ¡ 3;
d1 = d2 = 0 if k · 1=3 and k ¸ 1¡ 4¿:
(16)
Proof: See Appendix.
The result is summarized in Figure 2.
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*************************
Figure 2 here
*************************
We now mention the intuition behind Proposition 2. In this setting, when a downstream
¯rm enhances its degree of product di®erentiation (increases in di), it has a bene¯t and a
cost. The bene¯t stems from the mitigation of competition between the downstream ¯rms.
The cost stems from the increase in its procurement cost if the competitive force of potential
suppliers (their marginal costs are k + ¿di) is e®ective.
When ¿ is small, because the increase in di is less e®ective in increasing the procurement
cost (k + ¿di), both downstream ¯rms enhance the degree of product di®erentiation (see the
left side in Figure 2).
When k is small (k · 1=3), there can be two equilibria if ¿ is in the medium range
((1¡ k)=4 · ¿ · 6(1¡ k)=19 if k < 33=109, (1¡ k)=4 · ¿ · (k+3)=15 if 33=109 · k < 1=3).
That is, strategic complementarity concerning the strategies of product di®erentiation exists
(see the lower central area in Figure 2). When a downstream ¯rm engages in product R&D,
this investment mitigates the competition between the downstream ¯rms and enhances the
pro¯ts of both. The increase in the pro¯t of the downstream ¯rm that does not engage in
product R&D provides greater incentive to do so. On the other hand, when a downstream
¯rm does not engage in product R&D, the pro¯t levels of both downstream ¯rms are not
large. Because of the limited pro¯tability, product R&D undertaken by a downstream ¯rm
does not compensate for the increase in its procurement cost k+ ¿di. Therefore, if ¿ is in the
medium range, two equilibrium outcomes can appear.
If k is small and ¿ is su±ciently large, no downstream ¯rm engages in product R&D
because the increase in the procurement cost (k + ¿di) is signi¯cant (see the lower right side
of Figure 2).
When k is large, another interesting property can appear. Before we mention this property,
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we explain the relationship between wholesale prices and the value of k. In this model, k = 1=3
is a critical value concerning the strategies of product di®erentiation. If k is larger than 1=3,
potential suppliers do not function as a constraint on upstream ¯rms when downstream ¯rms
do not engage in product R&D (that is, d1 = d2 = 0 and ° = 1 ¡ d1 ¡ d2 = 1). From
the discussion of Section 3.1, when each upstream ¯rm monopolistically supplies input, the
wholesale price is wi = (2¡ °)=(4¡ °) = 1=3, which is smaller than k if no downstream ¯rm
engages in product R&D (d1 = d2 = 0).
When k is larger than 1=3 but is insu±ciently large, if a downstream ¯rm engages in
product R&D, the price set by the upstream ¯rm that supplies to another downstream ¯rm
becomes binding because the increase in the degree of product di®erentiation enhances the
incentive for the upstream ¯rms to set their prices at higher levels. This is because wi in
(6) is decreasing in °. Because the price of the upstream ¯rm that supplies the nonengaging
downstream ¯rm (call it ¯rm i) is binding, the wholesale price for ¯rm i is positively correlated
with the value of di. This feature of the wholesale price diminishes the incentive of ¯rm i to
engage in product R&D. Therefore, if k is in the medium range (1=3 < k < 12=31) and the
value of ¿ is large (¿ > (k + 3)=15), only one downstream ¯rm engages in product R&D (see
the upper right side of Figure 2). In this case, the pro¯t of the engaging downstream ¯rm is
smaller than that of the nonengaging downstream ¯rm.
4.2 Positive investment cost
From the discussion in the previous subsection, one may conclude that the degree of product
di®erentiation is large even when k is large. We now show that this conclusion is not always
true.
Following the discussion of Lin and Saggi (2002), we now suppose that each downstream
¯rm has to incur an investment cost for its product R&D. We now specify the investment cost
as F (di) = cd2i =2. The marginal investment cost is F
0(di) = cdi.
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4.2.1 No potential supplier
Substituting ° = 1¡ (d1 + d2) into ¼D1 and ¼D2, we have:
¼Di =
4
(3 + d1 + d2)2(3¡ d1 ¡ d2)2 ¡ cd
2
i =2; (i = 1; 2): (17)
Di®erentiating ¼Di with respect to di, we have:
@¼Di
@di
=
16(d1 + d2)
(3 + d1 + d2)3(3¡ d1 ¡ d2)3 ¡ cdi: (18)
We now provide three equilibrium outcomes that include minimum di®erentiation. Given
that d2 = 0, the marginal bene¯t from the investment (the partial derivative of ¦D1 ´
¼D1 + F (d1)) is zero when d1 = 0.
*************************
Figure 3 here
*************************
If c is large enough, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that F (di) = cd2i =2 for any di 2 [0; 1=2] (i = 1; 2). d1 = d2 = 0 is
an equilibrium outcome if c > 2272=99225 ' 0:02230: The pro¯ts of the downstream and the
upstream ¯rms are:
¼Di =
4
81
; ¼Ui =
2
27
: (19)
Proof: Given that d2 = 0, di®erentiating ¼D1 with respect to d1, we have,
@¼D1
@d1
¯¯¯¯
d2=0
=
d1(16¡ c(3¡ d1)3(3 + d1)3)
(3¡ d1)3(3 + d1)3 : (20)
Because (3 ¡ d1)3(3 + d1)3 is decreasing in d1 2 [0; 1=2], the partial derivative is (i) always
positive or (ii) negative (resp. positive) if d1 is small (resp. large) or (iii) always negative.
Therefore, the net pro¯t of ¯rm 1 is maximized when d1 = 0 or d1 = 1=2. If d1 = 0 maximizes
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the net pro¯t, d1 = d2 = 0 is an equilibrium outcome. When d1 = 0, the net pro¯t is 4=81.
When d1 = 1=2, it is (512 ¡ 1225c)=9800. A simple calculation (4=81 ¡ (512 ¡ 1225c)=9800)
leads to this proposition. Q.E.D.
Given that d2 = 1=2, the marginal bene¯t from ¯rm 1's investment is always positive (see
Figure 4).
*************************
Figure 4 here
*************************
If c is small enough, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that F (di) = cd2i =2 for any di 2 [0; 1=2] (i = 1; 2). d1 = d2 = 1=2 is
an equilibrium outcome if c < 1=16 ' 0:0625: The pro¯ts of the downstream and the upstream
¯rms are:
¼Di =
1
16
¡ c
8
; ¼Ui =
1
8
: (21)
Proof: Given that d2 = 1=2, the partial derivative of ¦D1 is
@¦D1
@d1
¯¯¯¯
d2=1=2
=
512(2d1 + 1)
(7 + 2d1)3(5¡ 2d1)3 : (22)
We now consider two functions.
y1 =
512(2x+ 1)
(7 + 2x)3(5¡ 2x)3 ; y2 = cx:
On the domain [0; 1=2], there is only one intersection of y1 and y2 if and only if c ¸ 1=16
otherwise there is no intersection. In other words, for any d1 · 1=2, the partial derivative of
¦D1 is larger than the marginal investment cost if and only if c < 1=16. Therefore, d1 = 1=2
is the optimal choice of ¯rm 1 if c · 1=16. Q.E.D.
The downstream ¯rm's pro¯t in which d1 = d2 = 1=2 is larger than that in which d1 =
d2 = 0 if and only if c < 17=162. When 1=16 < c < 17=162, maximum di®erentiation does
not appear in equilibrium even though it is more pro¯table for the downstream ¯rms.
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For intermediate values of c, there can be another symmetric equilibrium. We now suppose
that d1 = d2 = x. The ¯rst-order condition of each ¯rm is
32x
(3 + 2x)3(3¡ 2x)3 ¡ cx = 0 ! x
e ´ 1
2
s
9¡ 2
µ
4
c
¶1=3
: (23)
We can show that given dj = xe, the optimal choice of ¯rm i is di = dj = xe. In this case,
the pro¯ts of the downstream and upstream ¯rms are (see Figure 5):
¼Di =
4
(3 + 2xe)2(3¡ 2xe)2 ¡
c(xe)2
2
; ¼Ui =
2(1 + 2xe)
(3 + 2xe)2(3¡ 2xe) : (24)
*************************
Figure 5 here
*************************
Figure 6 provides an example in which multiple equilibria appear when c is an intermediate
value. In Figure 6, given that dj = 1=10, the optimal choice of ¯rm i is also di = 1=10.
Moreover, given that dj = 1=2, the optimal choice of ¯rm i is also di = 1=2. Both cases can
appear as equilibrium outcomes. xe has an interesting property. As the coe±cient of the
marginal investment cost increases, xe increases.
*************************
Figure 6 here
*************************
Summary The above discussion is summarized in Figure 7.
*************************
Figure 7 here
*************************
This result is in contrast with that in Brekke and Straume (2004). Using a Hotelling location
model with upstream units, they show that the existence of those upstream units enhances
16
the degree of product di®erentiation.12 In our setting, however, upstream units may diminish
the degree of product di®erentiation. To prove that the statement is true, we reconsider the
setting of Lin and Saggi (2002) (there is no upstream unit). In their model, the pro¯t of
each (downstream) ¯rm and the marginal gain of product innovation are (we assume that the
marginal cost is h and the demand functions are the same ones discussed here):
¼i =
(1¡ h)2
(3¡ di ¡ dj)2 ;
@¼i
@di
=
2(1¡ h)2
(3¡ di ¡ dj)3 ; i 6= j: (25)
Because the marginal gain from the product innovation is positive for any dj 2 [0; 1=2], the
equilibrium investment levels must be positive for any c (note that the marginal cost of the
investment is cdi). Therefore, we ¯nd that if c is large, the existence of upstream units
diminishes the degree of product di®erentiation.
4.2.2 Potential suppliers
In this part, our main focus is the comparison between the case in which each upstream ¯rm
monopolistically supplies its input, and that in which it faces potential input suppliers. We
only discuss region (a) in the previous subsection. That is, for any di 2 [0; 1] the ¯rst equation
in equation (13) applies. Substituting ° = 1¡ (d1 + d2) into ¼D1 in equation (13), we have:
¼D1 =
((1 + d1 + d2)(1¡ k)¡ (2d1 ¡ d2 + d1d2 + d22)¿)2
(3¡ d1 ¡ d2)2(1 + d1 + d2)2 ¡ cd
2
1=2: (26)
Di®erentiating ¼Di with respect to di, we have:
@¼D1
@d1
=
2((1 + d1 + d2)(1¡ k)¡ (2d1 ¡ d2 + d1d2 + d22)¿)
(3¡ d1 ¡ d2)3(1 + d1 + d2)3 (27)
£((1 + d1 + d2)2(1¡ k)¡ (6 + 2d21 + (9¡ 2d1 + d21)d2 ¡ 2(2¡ d1)d22 + d32)¿)¡ cd1:
12 Note that, in their model, there is no investment cost for product innovation. Even though we introduce
the product innovation costs discussed here into their model, the main result of their paper holds. That is,
upstream units enhance the degree of product di®erentiation in Brekke and Straume (2004).
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Given that d2 = 0, if the partial derivative is strictly positive, then the optimal value of d1 is
positive. Substituting d2 = 0 into the partial derivative, we have:
@¼D1
@d1
¯¯¯¯
d2=0
=
2((1 + d1)(1¡ k)¡ 2d1¿)
27
£ ((1¡ k + 2¿)d21 + 2(1¡ k)d1 + (1¡ k ¡ 6¿))¡ cd1: (28)
If k + 6¿ < 1, when d1 = 0, this is positive for any c(> 0). From the discussion, we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 If k + 6¿ < 1, the value of ° is lower than 1 for any c.
The small values of k and ¿ mean that upstream market competition is intense. In other words,
if the procurement conditions for the downstream ¯rms are preferable, the downstream ¯rms
tend to di®erentiate their products.
5 Concluding remarks
Using a simple product di®erentiation model with elastic demands, we investigate the relation-
ship between di®erentiation strategies and vertical relations. Depending on the competitive
structure in the upstream market, three di®erentiation patterns (maximum, minimum, and
partial) can appear in equilibrium even though each downstream ¯rm freely determines the
degree of product di®erentiation. These results are somewhat di®erent from those of previous
studies (Brekke and Straume (2004) and Matsushima (2004, 2008)) that discuss how upstream
units a®ect the di®erentiation strategies of downstream ¯rms. Our model provides additional
insights into the relationship between product di®erentiation and vertical relations.
We only consider the quantity-setting model. If we employed a price-setting model, the
competition structure in the downstream market would be quite di®erent. Although a price-
setting model is more complex than the quantity-setting model employed in this paper, in-
vestigating a price-setting model may be considered for future research.
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Table 1: An example of a payo® matrix
d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0 4=81 (3 + k)2=225
4=81 (27¡ 31k)2=3600
d1 = 1=2 (27¡ 31k)2=3600 (2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2=16
(3 + k)2=225 (2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2=16
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¿k
0 1/2
1/2
1/3
3/7
(g) (h)
(d) (e) (f)
(b)
(c)
(a)
Region di = 0 di = 0, dj = 1=2 di = 1=2
(a) (1) (1) (1)
(b) (1) (2) (1)
(c) (1) (2) (3)
(d) (3) (1) (1)
(e) (3) (2) (1)
(f) (3) (2) (3)
(g) (3) (3) (1)
(h) (3) (3) (3)
Figure 1: The relationship between k, ¿ , and the pro¯t functions in Eq. (13).
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k
H12,12L
H12,0L
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H12,12L
H0,0L
Figure 2: The equilibrium outcome.
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di
@¦Di=@di
0
0.01
0.005
0.5
Figure 3: The marginal bene¯t from ¯rm 1's investment (d2 = 0).
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di
@¦D1=@di
0
0.015
0.5
0.03
Figure 4: The partial derivative of ¼D1 (d2 = 1=2).
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?D(di = xe)
?D(di = 0.5)
?D(di = 0)
0.056
0.054
0.052
0.050
0.045
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0.055 0.060
c
?U
0.12
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.045
0.050
0.055 0.060
?U ?U(di = 0.5)
?U (di = xe)
?U (di = 0)
c
(downstream ¯rm) (upstream ¯rm)
Figure 5: The pro¯ts of the downstream and the upstream ¯rms.
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di
0
0.015
0.5
0.03
0.1
@¦Di=@di, cdi
@¦Di=@di (d2 = 0:5)
@¦Di=@di (d2 = 0:1)
cdi
Figure 6: Complementarity between the choices of di (c = 15625=351232).
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di
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Figure 7: Multiple equilibria
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Technical appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 We must verify the equilibrium outcomes in the eight regions in
Figure 1.
Region (a): The values of k and ¿ are in region (a). For any di (i = 1; 2), the ¯rst pro¯t
function (1) in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described as follows (note that,
° = 1¡ d1 ¡ d2 and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
(1¡ k)2
9
4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)2
225
(1¡ k)2
9
(6¡ 6k + ¿)2
225
d1 = 1=2
(6¡ 6k + ¿)2
225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)2
225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
(1¡ k)2
9
¡ 4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)
2
225
=
(k ¡ (1¡ 4¿))(11¡ 11k ¡ 4¿)
225
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k ¸ 1 ¡ 4¿ . Given that
d2 = 1=2, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (6¡ 6k + ¿)
2
225
=
(6¡ 19¿ ¡ 6k)(54¡ 54k ¡ 11¿)
3600
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k · (6¡19¿)=6. From the
discussion, we ¯nd that no case in which only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 appears in equilibrium
because there is no k that satis¯es both k · 1¡ 4¿ and k ¸ (6¡ 19¿)=6.
Region (b): The values of k and ¿ are in region (b). When d1 = d2 = 0 or d1 = d2 = 1=2,
the ¯rst pro¯t function (1) in equation (13) applies. When di = 0 and dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2,
i 6= j), the second pro¯t function (2) in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described
as follows (note that, ° = 1¡ d1 ¡ d2 and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
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d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
(1¡ k)2
9
(3 + k)2
225
(1¡ k)2
9
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
d1 = 1=2
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
(3 + k)2
225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
(1¡ k)2
9
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
=
8(2¡ k)(1¡ 3k)
225
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium for any k and ¿ . Given that
d2 = 1=2, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
=
(3¡ 15¿ + k)(57¡ 61k ¡ 15¿)
3600
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k ¸ 15¿ ¡ 3. Given that
d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(1¡ k)2
9
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
=
8(2¡ k)(1¡ 3k)
225
· 0
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
=
(3¡ 15¿ + k)(57¡ 61k ¡ 15¿)
3600
· 0:
We ¯nd that only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 in equilibrium if k = 1=3 and ¿ ¸ 2=9.
Region (c): The values of k and ¿ are in region (c). When d1 = d2 = 0, the ¯rst pro¯t
function (1) in equation (13) applies. When di = 0 and dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2, i 6= j), the second
pro¯t function (2) in equation (13) applies. When d1 = d2 = 1=2, the third pro¯t function (3)
in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described as follows (note that, ° = 1¡ d1¡ d2
and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
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d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
(1¡ k)2
9
(3 + k)2
225
(1¡ k)2
9
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
d1 = 1=2
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
1
16
(3 + k)2
225
1
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
(1¡ k)2
9
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
=
8(2¡ k)(1¡ 3k)
225
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium for any k and ¿ . Given that
d2 = 1=2, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
1
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
= ¡(42¡ 31k)(12¡ 31k)
3600
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that no case in which both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) appears in equilibrium.
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(1¡ k)2
9
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
=
8(2¡ k)(1¡ 3k)
225
· 0;
1
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
= ¡(42¡ 31k)(12¡ 31k)
3600
· 0:
We ¯nd that only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 in equilibrium if k = 1=3.
Region (d): The values of k and ¿ are in region (d). When d1 = d2 = 0, the third pro¯t
function (3) in equation (13) applies. In the remaining cases, the ¯rst pro¯t function (1) in
equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described as follows (note that, ° = 1 ¡ d1 ¡ d2
and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
33
d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
4
81
4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)2
225
4
81
(6¡ 6k + ¿)2
225
d1 = 1=2
(6¡ 6k + ¿)2
225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)2
225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
4
81
¡ 4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)
2
225
= ¡4(14¡ 9k ¡ 6¿)(4¡ 9k ¡ 6¿)
2025
¸ 0:
Because k · (3 ¡ 4¿)=7 in this region, the above inequality does not hold. We ¯nd that no
case in which both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) appears in equilibrium. Given that d2 = 1=2,
¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (6¡ 6k + ¿)
2
225
=
(6¡ 19¿ ¡ 6k)(54¡ 54k ¡ 11¿)
3600
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium for any k and ¿ . Given that
d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 chooses d1 = 1=2 if
4
81
¡ 4(3¡ 3k ¡ 2¿)
2
225
= ¡4(14¡ 9k ¡ 6¿)(4¡ 9k ¡ 6¿)
2025
· 0;
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (6¡ 6k + ¿)
2
225
=
(6¡ 19¿ ¡ 6k)(54¡ 54k ¡ 11¿)
3600
· 0:
We ¯nd that no case in which only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 appears in equilibrium.
Region (e): The values of k and ¿ are in region (e). When d1 = d2 = 0, the third pro¯t
function (3) in equation (13) applies. When di = 0 and dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2, i 6= j), the second
pro¯t function (2) in equation (13) applies. When d1 = d2 = 1=2, the ¯rst pro¯t function (1)
in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described as follows (note that, ° = 1¡ d1¡ d2
and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
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d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
4
81
(3 + k)2
225
4
81
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
d1 = 1=2
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
(3 + k)2
225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
4
81
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
= ¡(3k ¡ 1)(19 + 3k)
2025
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k = 1=3. Given that
d2 = 1=2, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
=
(3¡ 15¿ + k)(57¡ 61k ¡ 15¿)
3600
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k ¸ 15¿ ¡ 3. Given that
d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 chooses d1 = 1=2 if
4
81
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
= ¡(3k ¡ 1)(19 + 3k)
2025
· 0;
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
=
(3¡ 15¿ + k)(57¡ 61k ¡ 15¿)
3600
· 0:
We ¯nd that only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 in equilibrium if k · 15¿ ¡ 3.
Region (f): The values of k and ¿ are on region (f). When d1 = d2 = 0 or d1 = d2 = 1=2,
the third pro¯t function (3) in equation (13) applies. When di = 0 and dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2,
i 6= j), the second pro¯t function (2) in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described
as follows (note that, ° = 1¡ d1 ¡ d2 and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
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d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
4
81
(3 + k)2
225
4
81
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
d1 = 1=2
(27¡ 31k)2
3600
1
16
(3 + k)2
225
1
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
4
81
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
= ¡(3k ¡ 1)(19 + 3k)
2025
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k = 1=3. Given that
d2 = 1=2, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
1
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
=
(42¡ 31k)(31k ¡ 12)
3600
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium if k ¸ 12=31. Given that
d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 chooses d1 = 1=2 if
4
81
¡ (3 + k)
2
225
= ¡(3k ¡ 1)(19 + 3k)
2025
· 0;
1
16
¡ (27¡ 31k)
2
3600
=
(42¡ 31k)(31k ¡ 12)
3600
· 0:
We ¯nd that only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 in equilibrium if 1=3 · k · 12=31.
Region (g): The values of k and ¿ are in region (g). When d1 = d2 = 0 or di = 0 and
dj = 1=2 (i = 1; 2, i 6= j), the third pro¯t function (3) in equation (13) applies. When
d1 = d2 = 1=2, the ¯rst pro¯t function (1) in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is
described as follows (note that, ° = 1¡d1¡d2 and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
36
d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0
4
81
64
1225
4
81
64
1225
d1 = 1=2
64
1225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
64
1225
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 0 if
4
81
¡ 64
1225
= ¡ 284
99225
¸ 0:
We ¯nd that no case where both ¯rms choose di = 0 (i = 1; 2) appears in equilibrium. Given
that d2 = 1=2, ¯rm 1 also chooses d1 = 1=2 if
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ 64
1225
=
(102¡ 70k ¡ 35¿)(38¡ 70k ¡ 35¿)
19600
¸ 0:
Because k · (1 ¡ ¿)=2 in this region, the above inequality always holds. We ¯nd that both
¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium for any ¿ and k. Given that d2 = 0, ¯rm 1
chooses d1 = 1=2 if
4
81
¡ 64
1225
= ¡ 284
99225
· 0;
(2¡ 2k ¡ ¿)2
16
¡ 64
1225
=
(102¡ 70k ¡ 35¿)(38¡ 70k ¡ 35¿)
19600
· 0:
We ¯nd that no case where only one ¯rm chooses di = 0 appears in equilibrium.
Region (h): The values of k and ¿ are in region (h). For any di , the third pro¯t function (3)
in equation (13) applies. The payo® matrix is described as follows (note that, ° = 1¡ d1¡ d2
and we assume that F (di) = 0 in this section):
d2 = 0 d2 = 1=2
d1 = 0 4=81 64=1225
4=81 64=1225
d1 = 1=2 64=1225 1=16
64=1225 1=16
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We ¯nd that both ¯rms choose di = 1=2 (i = 1; 2) in equilibrium for any k and ¿ . The other
two cases do not appear in equilibrium.
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